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Trustless public ledgers (“TPLs”)—the technology underneath 
Bitcoin—do more than just create online money. The technology 
permits people to directly exchange money for what they want, with 
no intermediaries, such as credit card companies. Contract law is 
the law of bargained-for exchange, so a technology that enables 
direct exchange online will change the reality of online contracting. 
The current problem with consumer contracting online is that 
courts and companies have collaborated to create an online system 
in which consumers cannot bargain. Under the current regime, 
consumers have no choice but to click the “I Accept” button. Online, 
contract law is not the law of bargained-for exchange; it has become 
the law of company-dictated exchange. Smart contracts—
automated computer programs able to execute trades through 
TPLs—may offer a solution. This brief Essay explores the 
possibilities of smart contracts and their potential to correct the 
badly off-course law of online contract. 
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I. Introduction 
Trustless public ledgers are online lists, maintained by no one 
and available to everyone, that are maintained by a consensus 
protocol.1 For example, imagine a list on a whiteboard in a 
dormitory floor, keeping track of who paid for pizza last time. The 
advantages to such a list—public availability and ease of editing—
are clear. The disadvantages are equally clear. Someone might 
attempt to edit the list to their personal advantage. A solution that 
immediately suggests itself is that the dorm RA might be entrusted 
to keep the list. Yet then there is the concern that the RA may 
make a mistake, or be unavailable over the weekend, or be 
untrustworthy and edit the list to benefit himself. What is needed 
is a public ledger that is constrained by rules of consensus to 
prevent individuals from modifying the list to their exclusive 
benefit. That is the central technology underlying Bitcoin: the 
“trustless public ledger” (TPL).2 The ledger is public because 
anyone can download a copy.3 It is trustless because the underlying 
mathematical rules make it extraordinarily difficult to unilaterally 
change the list in the face of an opposing consensus.4 It is 
                                                                                                     
 1. See Barrett Sheridan, Bitcoins: Currency of the Geeks, BLOOMBERG 
BUSINESSWEEK (June 16, 2011), http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/ 
content/11_26/b4234041554873.htm (last visited July 31, 2014) (describing the 
communal verification process for Bitcoin transactions) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 2. See Paul H. Farmer, Jr., Speculative Tech: The Bitcoin Legal Quagmire 
and the Need for Legal Innovation, 9 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 85, 89 (2014) (explaining 
how public Bitcoin recordkeeping permits transactions without third party 
oversight). 
 3. See id. (describing the type of electronic ledger used in Bitcoin 
transactions); Nikolei M. Kaplanov, Nerdy Money: Bitcoin, the Private Digital 
Currency, and the Case Against Its Regulation, 25 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 111, 
116 (2012) (describing the public nature of Bitcoin transactions). 
 4. See Farmer, supra note 2, at 89 (describing the “cryptographic proof” of 
transactions maintained in the ledger, which are designed to remove third 
parties’ ability to manipulate transactions). 
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disintermediated because no single entity can control or 
manipulate the list.5 Entrepreneurs and analysts agree that 
TPLs—of which Bitcoin is merely one example6—can potentially 
restructure the power relationship between consumers and 
intermediaries online.7 Because the Bitcoin block-chain protocol is 
strongly disintermediated, intermediaries lose some of the pride of 
place that they enjoyed in the online economy as it evolved over 
the past twenty years.8 
The rhetoric of Bitcoin enthusiasts is overblown, but contains 
a kernel of truth. Although TPLs will not cause internet 
intermediaries to wither away, they will cause a shift in the 
balance of power between consumers and intermediaries.9 
                                                                                                     
 5. See id. at 89–90 (explaining how each transaction requires information 
(the public and private keys) from both the buyer and seller, which is recorded in 
the transaction data and cannot be altered by one person). 
 6. See John Evans, Bitcoin 2.0: Unleash the Sidechains, TECHCRUNCH (Apr. 
19, 2014), http://techcrunch.com/2014/04/19/bitcoin-2-0-unleash-the-sidechains/ 
(last visited Aug. 5, 2014) (“Bitcoin is both the first and most successful blockchain 
application, but there are many, many other ‘cryptocurrencies,’ known as 
‘altcoins.’”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 7. See, e.g., Kevin Werbach, The Centripetal Network: How the Internet 
Holds Itself Together, and the Forces Tearing It Apart, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 343, 
347–48 (2008) (providing one example of the disruptive power of public ledgers 
that allows capital to be used to develop new services such as the elimination of 
transaction costs); Perianne Boring, BitGo Raises $12Mil, Draws Attention of 
Institutional Investors, FORBES (June 16, 2014), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/perianneboring/2014/06/16/bitgo-raises-12mil-
draws-attention-of-institutional-investors/ (last visited July 31, 2014) (discussing 
one innovation, multi-signature technology (“Multisig”), which gives parties using 
Bitcoin recourse in the case of the other party’s nonperformance) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review); John Villasenor, Could ‘Multisig’ Help Bring 
Consumer Protection to Bitcoin Transactions?, FORBES (Mar. 28, 2014), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/johnvillasenor/2014/03/28/could-multisig-help-bring-
consumer-protection-to-bitcoin-transactions/ (last visited July 31, 2014) 
(describing Multisig’s effects on markets using Bitcoin) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 8. See Kaplanov, supra note 3, at 116 (describing public ledger systems, 
specifically Bitcoin transactions, as “free of third party presence—whether that 
third party is a government, bank, payment network, or clearinghouse. . . . [This] 
allows parties to the transaction to deal directly with one another without a third 
party authorizing the transaction”). 
 9. See supra note 7 and accompanying text (describing one innovative 
service, Multisig, where third parties will continue to be relevant because they 
serve as custodians, ensuring both parties to a transaction perform their 
obligations). 
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Consumers may still find it useful to use bank-like institutions. 
Yet they need not. The trustless ledger system permits them to 
transfer and hold money in large amounts on their own account.10 
The question is whether TPLs will have a similar effect in other 
areas of law outside of the financial sector.11 
What has until now flown under the radar is the fact that 
Bitcoin is merely the tip of an iceberg. Given the speed with which 
new business models are developing around crypto-currencies and 
trustless technologies,12 it is time to start looking past routine 
financial applications of such ledgers as currencies. They do much 
more. TPLs permit parties not only to hold digital assets of value 
without banking intermediaries; they also permit parties to 
transfer digital assets of value directly, on their own terms, 
without any institution acting as an exchange intermediary.13  
Smart contracts—automated programs that transfer digital 
assets within the block-chain upon certain triggering 
conditions14—represent a new and interesting form of organizing 
                                                                                                     
 10. See Rob Wile, Satoshi’s Revolution: How the Creator of Bitcoin May Have 
Stumbled Onto Something Much, Much Bigger, BUSINESS INSIDER (Apr. 22, 2014), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/the-future-of-the-blockchain-2014-4 (last visited 
Aug. 4, 2014) (describing how block-chain security permits individuals to verify 
transactions and property’s existence, therefore assuring market participants of 
the safety of the block-chain-based digital marketplace) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 11. See id. (speculating as to whether groups such as BitShares and 
Ethereum will succeed in efforts to implement block-chain technology in areas 
such as stock exchanges, voting, and music distribution). 
 12. See EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK, VIRTUAL CURRENCY SCHEMES 16–18 
(2012), https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/virtualcurrencyschemes201210 
en.pdf (describing the plethora of virtual currencies from the Linden Dollar to 
Bitcoin and the services that accompany them, including Paypal). 
 13. See Wile, supra note 10 (“[TPLs have] no intermediaries, therefore 
there’s really nothing to stop a computer from just connecting to the Internet and 
taking part all by itself. All you need to do to instantiate a Bitcoin wallet is 
generate a large random number.” (quoting an interview with Mike Hearn)); 
supra note 8 and accompanying text (describing public ledgers as being virtually 
free of intermediaries). 
 14. See David Morris, Bitcoin Is Not Just Digital Currency. It’s Napster for 
Finance., FORTUNE (Jan. 21, 2014), http://fortune.com/2014/01/21/bitcoin-is-not-
just-digital-currency-its-napster-for-finance/ (last visited Aug. 5, 2014) (defining 
smart contracts and providing examples such as a car that would automatically 
disable itself if loan payments were not made) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review). 
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contractual activity. If financial transactions can be freed of banks 
as intermediaries, then contracts can be freed of courts as 
intermediaries. This solves a longstanding puzzle and problem of 
e-commerce: courts’ longstanding refusal to enforce contract terms 
proffered by consumers.15 If courts will not protect consumers, 
robots will.16 Consumers can use automated consumer-grade 
purchasing agents, tied to Bitcoin wallets and preprogrammed 
with consumer preferences, to reclaim their ability to negotiate in 
online transactions. 
This Essay proceeds as follows. Part II briefly discusses how 
TPLs disintermediate online exchange, and further describes how 
exchange disintermediation can lead to a revitalization of 
consumers’ ability to offer, enter into, and enforce contracts online. 
Part III discusses the phenomenon of online consumer contract 
exclusion, and explores why consumer-proffered contract terms are 
denied enforcement in e-commercial arrangements. Part IV 
focuses on how Bitcoin-fueled smart contracts can be used by 
automated software agents to protect consumers’ identity from 
theft and automatically enforce their contractual preferences. Part 
V discusses and engages the standard challenges to consumer-
oriented theories of online contract.  
                                                                                                     
 15. See, e.g., James Gibson, Vertical Boilerplate, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 161, 
167–69 (2013) (noting that the modern marketplace relies on competition to weed 
out onerous contracting terms, rather than consumer negotiation); id. at 170–80 
(explaining why the idealized compensatory model does not work with boilerplate 
contract language in the modern marketplace); Cheryl B. Preston & Eli W. 
McCann, Unwrapping Shrinkwraps, Clickwraps, and Browsewraps: How the Law 
Went Wrong from Horse Traders to the Law of the Horse, 26 BYU J. PUB. L. 1, 23 
(2011) (explaining how online service providers often do “not allow the consumer 
the same luxury of changing the contract at will, but instead retains the 
unilateral modification power exclusively for itself”); id. at 23–28 (exploring the 
legal sacrifices that consumers make when contracting with online service 
providers—a completely asymmetric contract relationship); see also Joshua 
Fairfield, Virtual Property, 85 B.U. L. REV. 1047, 1071–72 (2005) (describing 
traditional limits on contract enforceability, including limits on use and locking-
in low-value property uses). 
 16. See Morris, supra note 14 (explaining that, because Bitcoin is entirely 
distributed, the system permits “loans without banks, contracts without lawyers, 
and stocks without brokers, executed and recorded across hundreds of servers at 
all corners of the earth”). 
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II. Radical Disintermediation 
TPLs disintermediate exchange.17 They permit parties to 
transmit money or other valuable online assets to one another 
securely and cheaply, without relying on any centralized entity to 
curate a database of who owns what.18 Previous systems for digital 
money have relied on a centralized list curator to control the list of 
which assets are ascribed to whom.19 Thus, to move a digital asset 
from Person A to B, one must contact the list curator, and have 
that person change the entry “Person A owns asset X,” to “Person 
B owns asset X.” The cost of the list curator and the chance that 
that curator may fail, mishandle, or manipulate the list, are all 
costs that must be borne by such systems. 
TPL systems propose a solution to the problem of expensive 
intermediaries. They offer a consensus system for maintaining a 
decentralized list of who owns what.20 The coordination problem is 
addressed by a proof-of-work system, which makes it expensive 
and difficult to compromise the list.21 This system scales elegantly: 
the more value that comes into the system, and the more people 
that seek it, the harder the system is to compromise.22  
A full discussion of the mechanics of Bitcoin is well beyond the 
scope of this short Essay, and much has already been written. 
What is important to take away is that Bitcoin innovates in two 
ways. It is a method for tracking who owns which property 
                                                                                                     
 17. See Kaplanov, supra note 3, at 125–26 (explaining Bitcoin’s ability to 
eliminate intermediaries as necessary parties to transactions). 
 18. See id. at 127–28 (discussing how Bitcoins are used to get around 
traditional methods of blocking money transfers, and how some people treat 
Bitcoins as an investment). 
 19. Cf. supra note 7 and accompanying text (describing one innovative 
service, Multisig, where third parties will continue to be relevant because they 
serve as custodians, ensuring both parties to a transaction perform their 
obligations). 
 20. See Evans, supra note 6 (describing TPLs and block-chain technology as 
“a peer-to-peer network . . . used to codify and cryptographically verify 
transactions, without any central authority”). 
 21. See Morris, supra note 14 (explaining the proof-of-work system as 
constant vetting of transactions by a “vast network of ‘miners’ rewarded for their 
maintenance work with a stream of bitcoin”). 
 22. See Sheridan, supra note 1 (illustrating the miners’ work and how larger 
numbers and processing power allow for a more secure TPL). 
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interests without a centralized intermediary, and it is a method for 
transferring that property directly, peer to peer.23 The second 
characteristic has further ramifications. If consumers can now 
make disintermediated property or currency exchanges, then they 
can begin to make disintermediated contractual arrangements.24 
If consumers can hold money without banks, they can enforce 
contracts without courts.25 If consumers can offer their own 
standardized contractual agreements, then they may be able to 
undo the radical disenfranchisement of consumers in online 
contracting environments.  
III. Consumer Contract Exclusion 
This Essay supports its argument that courts prevent 
consumers from enforcing expressed online contractual terms 
through a thought experiment. Consider and compare the 
following scenarios. First, a consumer logs onto a corporate web 
server, seeking to buy a widget. She encounters there contractual 
terms and conditions, which she clicks through without reading 
(although she has a rough idea what is in them), and concludes a 
purchase. The contract is enforceable according to its terms.26 
Second, a software agent logs into a corporate web server. The 
computer program encounters various terms and conditions, either 
because of an electronic data interchange27 format (for business-to-
                                                                                                     
 23. See Morris, supra note 14 (illustrating both direct property transfers and 
the public tracking of transfers within a TPL network). 
 24. See id. (describing property relationships that would be enabled with 
Bitcoin technology, including managing real-world leases and entering into 
mortgages and purchase contracts). 
 25. See id. (giving one example: the ability to enforce car payments). 
 26. See Mark Lemley, Terms of Use, 91 MINN. L. REV. 459, 466 (2006) (stating 
that every court that has considered the validity of shrink-wrap contracts has 
held them valid and binding); Rachel Conklin, Be Careful What You Click For: An 
Analysis of Online Contracting, 20 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 325, 327 (2008) 
(“Clickwrap contracts have been accepted as valid by United States courts 
virtually every time they have been challenged.”). 
 27. An electronic data interchange is “the computer-to-computer exchange of 
business documents in a standard electronic format between business partners.” 
What is EDI (Electronic Data Interchange)?, EDI BASICS, 
http://www.edibasics.com/what-is-edi/#sthash.pMY8jxXo.dpuf (last visit Aug. 29, 
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business purchases), or because it runs into some other machine-
readable text, such as a robots.txt file (for web crawlers and 
indexing agents). The machine concludes a purchase. The contract 
is enforceable according to its terms.28 
Third, a consumer’s software agent logs into a corporate web 
server. The consumer’s software agent offers specific contractual 
terms stating the terms on which the consumer is willing to deal. 
For example, the consumer may have informed the web server that 
she is only willing to deal with that server if the server respects 
her desire not to sell her personal data, by setting a “do not track” 
flag.29 The corporate web server, having been apprised of those 
terms but programmed to take no notice of them, concludes a 
purchase anyway. The consumer contract is not enforceable 
according to its terms.30  
Why? Somewhere in the shift from dickered, black letter law-
negotiated contracting to non-dickered, standardized, mass-
market consumer contracting, the ability of consumers to negotiate 
their own contract terms vanished.31 Under sustained assault by 
                                                                                                     
2014) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). A “computer-to-
computer” transaction means that “EDI documents can flow straight through to 
the appropriate application on the receiver’s computer (e.g., the Order 
Management System) and processing can begin immediately” without involving 
paper or people. Id. 
 28. See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT § 719.310 (2001) (“A contract may be formed by 
the interaction of electronic agents of the parties, even if no natural person was 
aware of or reviewed the electronic agents’ actions or the resulting terms and 
agreements.”). 
 29. A “do not track” flag is a browser setting that allows consumers “to choose 
whether they want to allow websites to collect information about their Internet 
activity and use it to deliver targeted advertisements and for other purposes.” Do 
Not Track, FED. TRADE COMMISSION, http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/media-
resources/protecting-consumer-privacy/do-not-track (last visited Aug. 30, 2014) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 30. See Lemley, supra note 26, at 464 (describing the battle of the forms and 
noting that when a contract features conflicting forms, the conflicting terms are 
read out of the contract unless one party has demonstrated a willingness to forgo 
the deal over that term); Ian Rambarran & Robert Hunt, Are Browse-Wrap 
Agreements All They Are Wrapped Up To Be?, 9 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 173, 
201 (2007) (arguing that implied consent to privacy terms can be created by 
browse-wrap agreements). 
 31. See Conklin, supra note 26, at 329–30 (explaining that, when 
interpreting browse-wrap contracts, courts generally find that a user’s acceptance 
is implied by his or her use of a website); Lemley, supra note 26, at 470–71 
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courts and legal theorists, a consumer’s ability to proffer legally 
binding online contractual arrangements has almost 
disappeared.32  
This state of affairs is fact, but has no basis in law. Courts do 
not enforce consumer-proffered online terms as enforceable 
contractual terms,33 but they also do not admit that this is what 
they are doing.34 Courts instead exclude the consumer preference 
from the four corners of the online agreement.35 What the company 
wrote is “the contract,” and the expression of consumer preference 
is simply not part of that contract.36 Courts manipulate the 
contours of the contractual agreement to exclude expressions of 
consumer preference in online agreements.37 If, however, 
consumers were able to somehow express their preferences 
unmistakably within the contours of what courts consider to be the 
online agreement, then courts would have no choice but to 
recognize consumer-proffered online contract terms.38 Instead of 
just clicking “I Agree,” consumers could actually contract again. 
                                                                                                     
(explaining that judicial interpretation of browse-wrap contracts is based on 
traditional trespass: domain owners need only give notice that “trespassing” on 
their website is conditioned by contract terms in order to enforce their property 
rights). 
 32. See supra note 30 and accompanying text (demonstrating how, when a 
website user has a form contract or terms that are not explicitly accepted by the 
other party and the website user continues to use the website, the user’s terms 
are read out of the contract and are not binding). 
 33. See supra note 30 and accompanying text (explaining that consumer-
proffered online contract terms are unenforceable under current “battle of the 
forms” jurisprudence). 
 34. See infra note 35 (describing the factors courts purportedly consider). 
 35. See Rambarran, supra note 30, at 186 (describing three factors courts 
look at when analyzing browse-wrap contracts: notice, consent, and whether the 
substantive requirements for the particular terms were met). 
 36. See supra note 30 and accompanying text (explaining that consumer-
proffered online contract terms are read out of a contract when there is a battle 
of the forms). 
 37. See Lemley, supra note 26, at 472–77 (describing courts’ willingness to 
enforce browse-wrap terms against business consumers and concluding that 
courts are more willing to enforce retroactive amendments to contracts without 
consent and other anti-consumer terms in the business-to-business context). 
 38. See id. at 464 (arguing that a parallel interpretive canon to the “battle of 
the forms” for online business-to-business contracting would allow additional 
consumer power). 
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This is why e-commerce websites are so carefully engineered 
to limit any consumer expression of preference beyond quantity. 
When one shops at Amazon, one may pick the number of items 
shipped, but nothing else.39 There is no drop-down box for 
consumer terms provided.40 Consumers are constrained by the 
form of the webpage from offering other terms, such as 
reservations of rights and warranties.41 Consider the routine 
online disclaimer of warranties, which has eviscerated consumer 
protections offered by the Uniform Commercial Code.42 Some 
consumers may wish to pay more and refuse the disclaimer of 
warranty. Indeed, the Code system is so structured that if one 
party disclaims warranties, and the other requires those 
warranties, then the warranties exist.43 Yet in the online context, 
such a disagreement over warranties cannot happen.44 There is no 
warranty drop-down box. 
IV. Automated Agents and Consumer Protection 
What is needed is a format in which consumers can express 
their preferences to automated agents (often termed “bots” or 
“robots,” despite the agents’ lack of physicality), and then expect 
their preferences to be enforced. If courts discriminate against 
consumer preferences in online contracting, consumers will need 
                                                                                                     
 39. See, e.g., The Sopranos: The Complete Series, AMAZON, 
http://www.amazon.com/Sopranos-Complete-Various/dp/B006CR2OOA/ref=sr_ 
1_1?s=movies-tv&ie=UTF8&qid=1408632827&sr=1-1&keywords=sopranos+com 
plete+series (last visited Aug. 21, 2014) (allowing a customer to choose the 
quantity she would like to order) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 40. See, e.g., id. (providing a single drop-down box for quantity). 
 41. See, e.g., id. (providing no functionality for consumers to propose 
additional terms). 
 42. See Rambarran, supra note 30, at 187–90 (discussing warranties and 
other consumer protection devices articulated in the Uniform Commercial Code). 
 43. See Lemley, supra note 26 (“[T]he Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) 
resolved this ‘battle of the forms’ by adopting a compromise: if the terms conflict, 
neither party’s terms become part of the contract unless a party demonstrates its 
willingness to forego the deal over it.” (citing U.C.C. § 2-207(3) (2003)). 
 44. See supra notes 39–41 and accompanying text (describing consumers’ 
lack of options for online contracting). 
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to turn to automated agents to protect their contractual 
preferences. 
Automated consumer-grade purchasing software is already in 
common circulation. Consider eBay “sniping” programs. These are 
programs that are set to auto-bid on an item, up to a certain price, 
with certain parameters involving speed of bid and time interval 
between bids. The purpose of the sniping program is to wait to bid 
up an item until the time of the item has nearly expired. EBay 
offers its own bid-up program, permitting buyers to make 
automated bids up to a given level, to resist sniping from 
outsiders.45 Thus, these systems are not only extant, they are 
commonplace. 
What is not yet commonplace is the use of automated 
consumer purchasing software on an internet-wide scale. One 
reason for this is the limits and variability of payment options. It 
is possible to find a program that could be given a consumer’s 
credit-card information and told to hunt for good deals, and such 
programs have indeed been floated. But the variation in payment 
formats and the cost and complexities of payment have stymied 
widespread use of consumer-grade automation software. The early 
1990s hesitation to entrust websites with credit card data has 
become an early 2010s hesitation to entrust automation software 
with financial information. This is all the more the case because of 
identity fraud.  
Yet, identity fraud is a byproduct of the locked-down financial 
e-commercial infrastructure within which consumers have been, 
until now, constrained to operate. Until recently, a party who 
wishes to pay for something online must reveal her personal 
information. This is because the nature of the transaction is 
contract-based, not property-based. An online payment is not a 
transfer of money from one person to another. It is, properly 
speaking, a chain of promises to pay. The credit card company 
settles with the bank of the vendor and receives payment in 
monthly installments from the consumer. For such a chain to 
function, each party must know the identity of the other parties in 
                                                                                                     
 45. See Automatic Bidding, EBAY, http://pages.ebay.com/help/buy/ 
automatic-bidding.html (last visited Aug. 21, 2014) (describing eBay’s automatic 
bidding system, in which a customer may set a maximum bid and eBay will 
automatically increase the customer’s bid to maintain the highest bid up to the 
chosen maximum bid) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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the chain. A future promise to pay on the part of entity X is useless 
unless one knows X’s identity.   
Crypto-currency transactions, by contrast, permit consumers 
to buy items online without exposing their personal information. A 
consumer can transfer digital cash directly, instead of constructing 
a chain of identity supporting a promise of future payment. The 
vendor does not need to know who the buyer is, merely that the 
buyer can pay the amount of digital cash required. Consider the 
recent massive loss of credit card information by Target and other 
retailers during the 2013 holiday season.46 Had those transactions 
been in Bitcoin, the consumers would have been as safe from 
identity theft as if they had paid in cash.  
Automated software agents can be programmed with their 
own Bitcoin wallets, and can release funds, or not, according to 
consumer-set parameters. If companies do not satisfy the 
parameters, the deal does not go through. Consider a simple smart 
contract that a consumer instructs to buy a toaster. It is 
programmed to seek a single unit of the item, at the lowest price, 
and subject to a reservation of all rights and remedies, including 
all standard consumer warranties. The agent is connected to a 
Bitcoin wallet, and can therefore pay for the item without releasing 
the consumer’s identity into the wild. Indeed, depending on the 
nature of the transaction and the need for shipping addresses, it is 
entirely possible that the agent can buy and sell on the consumer’s 
behalf without providing any information about the consumer to 
the company at all. 
V. Challenges to Consumer-Originated Smart Contracts 
There are several challenges to this conception of smart 
contracts, automated agents, and consumer protection. Because 
these theoretical challenges represent the current received legal 
wisdom, they are briefly addressed and engaged here. 
                                                                                                     
 46. See Target Confirms Unauthorized Access to Payment Card Data in U.S. 
Stores, TARGET (Dec. 19, 2013), http://pressroom.target.com/news/target-
confirms-unauthorized-access-to-payment-card-data-in-u-s-stores (last visited 
August 14, 2014) (confirming unauthorized access to more than forty million 
credit and debit card accounts) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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First, and most pragmatically, the technology is not shovel-
ready. As futurist Clay Shirky has noted, technological revolutions 
do not get interesting socially until they are boring 
technologically.47 Attempts to package and deliver consumer 
contractual preferences have foundered on whether the technology 
can operate smoothly. 
Here, however, TPLs can play a large role in simplifying and 
enabling consumer-driven automated agents. The value 
proposition of TPLs is complicated, and the means by which the 
ledger itself is secured is a matter of moderately complex 
mathematics and some game theory. Yet the use of crypto-
currencies themselves is simple and could be even simpler. In 
particular, TPLs completely remove a major source of consumer 
hesitancy and complexity by eliminating the need for consumers to 
entrust automated agents with their personal information. A 
consumer setting up an autonomous agent would not even need to 
designate with whom the contract would be concluded. A price, a 
quantity, and warranties would do. The consumer can protect 
against software malfunction by funding the agent with limited 
amounts. There is only so much damage the agent can do.   
A second challenge to consumer-oriented contract approaches 
is the claim that companies will ignore consumer-proffered 
contract terms and that courts will enable them to continue doing 
so.48 This is a non-trivial concern, yet there is hope. Crypto-
currency-fueled smart contracts offer a digital cash-on-the-
barrelhead transaction. For a range of transactions, the consumer 
is protected. Her personal information is safe. If the company does 
not offer what the consumer seeks, the agent does not act, and the 
contract is not concluded. This leaves as a risk only those 
transactions in which a company has made representations to an 
agent on which the company then reneges. Here there is some hope 
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that a court will apply more traditional, dickered, black letter law 
to enforce the consumer-proffered contract. There is at least some 
chance of convincing courts that the seller has accepted the buyer’s 
offer, rather than the other way around.  
A third challenge comes from theorists who are concerned 
about minimizing overall transaction costs for the online economy. 
These theorists see contract standardization as positive because it 
reduces information costs, and they see companies as a better 
source for standardization than consumers.49 The concern is that 
if companies are forced to respond to thousands of one-off unique 
consumer contractual proposals, they will not be able to create the 
economies of contractual scale that are necessary to reduce costs.50 
These theorists are half right. Standardization is important to 
reduce transaction costs. Indeed, standardization is necessary in 
order to create contracts that are sufficiently standardized to 
become machine-readable. Where the information-cost theorists go 
wrong is in assuming that companies are a better source of 
standardized deals than are consumers. Companies create prolix 
and confusing online contracts. Consumers merely want the 
standard deal, with no complex reservations. A pro-consumer 
standardized contract is simple: all remedies and rights are 
reserved. A corporate-drafted contract, even for a relatively 
straightforward consumer purchase, can run into tens of pages. 
Consumers minimize complexity. Companies minimize their legal 
risk, even (perhaps especially) when doing so increases complexity.  
Companies may of course refuse to do business with consumer-
originated automated agents, just as companies may refuse to 
accept crypto-currencies. Yet this is very unlikely. Consider that 
companies already retool—indeed, optimize—their websites at 
significant cost to accommodate automated agents, such as 
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Google’s web crawlers. Those robots are consumer agents by 
extension: they gather information, which is placed at consumers’ 
disposal. To a large extent, the search side of the online purchasing 
equation has already been automated. What remains is to 
automate the purchase itself, which is what crypto-currency-
backed smart contracts can do. 
VI. Conclusion 
Currency uses of TPLs are merely the first wave of the 
technology. The math is out of the bag. While TPLs began by 
proposing a solution disintermediating online property, that 
disintermediation is likely to affect other areas of law. One area 
that has long been ripe for reform is consumer contracting. To date, 
mass-market contracting has rested on the principle that 
companies can, through their design of the technological 
contracting process, exclude expressions of consumer preference, 
and that courts will tacitly support this effort by excluding 
consumer terms from the four corners of the electronic contracts 
courts enforce. 
Smart contracts will test the poorly conceived legal 
foundations of the current mass-market consumer-term-exclusion 
regime. Crypto-currency-backed autonomous agents can offer to 
buy items without any need to pass on the consumer’s identity or 
payment information. Such agents can further offer digital cash-
on-the-barrelhead contracts. It will be much more difficult for a 
vendor who has accepted such a deal to then later assert that it is 
not bound by the contractual terms offered by the agent.  
Disintermediation has chain effects. Although the debate 
surrounding Bitcoin and similar crypto-currencies has almost 
entirely focused on the effect of such systems on the payments and 
banking infrastructures, there will be more, and more important, 
changes that will result from the placing of online financial control 
back into consumers’ hands. Once smart contracts answerable to 
consumers alone are doing the shopping, vendors will either have 
to respect consumer-proffered contractual demands, or petition 
courts to continue to undermine consumer contracting power 
online. Both will happen, but the former is more likely. Those 
50 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 35 (2014) 
companies who choose to challenge, rather than respect, consumer-
driven smart contract purchases will simply not get paid. 
